Business Forum: Why Minnesota Won't Catch Up in Software -- and why
it won't matter
By Isaac Cheifetz
Published April 2, 2001
I was having dinner with a Minnesota-based
venture capitalist in Uptown Minneapolis last month. He complained that there
are only a handful of software companies of national stature based in Minnesota,
driving him and other VCs to invest the bulk of their funds on either coast.
While Minnesota has hundreds of software
companies, there are only a handful that are market leaders nationally. Why is
this so, given the technical and business excellence here?
Minnesota historically was a major center for
computer vendors. Of the nine top computer companies in 1980 (IBM, Sperry,
Burroughs, Control Data, Honeywell, DEC, Harris, HP and Cray), four had
headquarters in Minnesota, and IBM had a key plant in Rochester.
Minnesota is an unusually vibrant business
center, with nearly 40 Fortune 1000 companies based here. That's about twice as
many Fortune 1000 companies per capita as the national average.
Minnesota's economy is not limited to large
companies. It has a continuing track record of successful start-ups in a variety
of industries, particularly medical devices and manufacturing, and a robust
investment community (a Fortune magazine article on the topic several years ago
was headlined "MoneyApolis"). It has a world-class research university, a key
factor in the growth of regional technology centers.
Some reasons for the state of the Minnesota
software industry are historical, others perhaps cultural. Historically,
Minnesota's mainframe computer companies, with their proprietary architectures
and high profit margins, did not flourish in the PC age, when even
supercomputers became commodities. Moreover, the mainframe companies were
focused primarily on hardware -- "Big Iron" -- rather than software.
Software as Commodity
Entrepreneurs who left those companies to start
software companies had few software "home runs" to compare themselves to.
Contrast this to Silicon Valley, where a software entrepreneur would have
Fortune 1000 software companies such as Oracle or Peoplesoft as benchmarks for
success and return on investment.
Culturally, the very stability of the Midwestern
business ethic may be a hindrance to pure high-tech companies. Northern
California and Texas, two major software development clusters, are notable for
their "boom or bust" cultures. Winning big, with brash style, is the goal.
Failing big, also with brash style, is respected in Silicon Valley and Texas,
and considered no cause for shame.
In contrast, Minnesota's business culture esteems
growing businesses that are profitable market leaders. Its investing mentality
is similarly an incremental one, valuing singles and doubles as much as home
runs. Additionally, the imbalanced lifestyle that Silicon Valley start-ups often
require, with their 100-hour work weeks, generally is disdained here and
required only as a last resort.
This trend also manifests itself in the impact of
economic downturns. In 1990, after the 1987 stock market crash, the S&L crisis
and the end of the Cold War, New York, Boston, Texas and California were hit
hard, with employment rates and real estate prices sharply receding.
Minnesota, with its balanced economy not
dependent on any one industry, suffered only a mild economic slowdown,
sidestepping the more intense downturn of regions heavily reliant (and
speculating) on finance, defense, energy and technology.
Can Minnesota catch up in the software industry?
Even if it can, it shouldn't try.
The software industry no longer is where the
action is. A wave of commodification has swept across the computer industry the
past 10 years, first hitting hardware, now challenging software vendors.
In hardware, only Dell (arguably more of a
supply-chain innovator than a computer company), Compaq, Sun, HP and IBM are
relatively healthy. Investors would be hesitant to invest in a new computer
company, however innovative the technology. No new computer company has launched
to profitability in more than 15 years.
Leverage Local Strengths
Similarly, in software, a handful of dominant
companies (Microsoft, Oracle, Computer Associates) make the overwhelming
majority of profits, and the bulk of the industry loses money. This imbalance in
software-vendor profitability has grown during the past five years but was
masked by the dot-com era's high market capitalizations.
So "catching up" in software is no more desirable
than "catching up" in hardware -- it has evolved into a commodity niche with low
margins. What does matter in the present global economy, with the Internet
innovating and disrupting every industry, is solving business problems using the
new technologies, and delivering these services on Web-based platforms.
And that's the good news. Minnesota is unusually
well-positioned to play a key role in the next stage of the Digital Economy, as
the workflow of entire industries moves to the Internet. The concentration of
blue-chip companies, the expertise in corporate IT and outsourcing, and the
culture of long-term profitability all will be competitive advantages as
e-commerce matures from an adolescent to young adult.
Partnerships between industry and education and
technology clusters should focus on local strengths: industries such as health
care, agriculture and retail, and IT disciplines such as data storage, decision
support and enterprise application integration.
There is a great deal that can be done to
leverage and enhance the local high-tech economy, but it is critical that
resources be aimed at the future sweet spot of the economy, not the past.