"IT Doesn't Matter," an article in May's Harvard
Business Review by Nicholas Carr, has stirred up a remarkable
amount of controversy. It argues that as information technology
has become a business priority, it also has turned into a
commodity and lost much of its strategic potential for companies.
Carr suggests that IT is following the path of past
technological innovations such as the internal combustion engine
or electricity, whose adoption made them less of a competitive
advantage. According to Carr, "For a brief period, as they
were being built into the infrastructure of commerce, all these
technologies opened opportunities for forward-looking companies to
gain real advantages. But as their availability increased and
their cost decreased -- as they became ubiquitous -- they became
commodity inputs."
Carr recommends that companies de-emphasize investments in IT:
"When a resource becomes essential to competition but
inconsequential to strategy, the risks it creates become more
important than the advantages it provides. Think of electricity.
Today, no company builds its business strategy around its
electricity usage, but even a brief lapse in supply can be
devastating. . . . Today an IT disruption can paralyze a company's
ability to make its products, deliver its services, and connect
with its customers, not to mention foul its reputation. Yet few
companies have done a thorough job of identifying and tempering
their vulnerabilities."
Last month's massive blackout and the repeated attacks from
Internet-based viruses and worms on PCs with Microsoft operating
systems dramatically underscores these vulnerabilities.
Carr further argues that once-proprietary business applications
such as American Airlines' Sabre reservation system no longer are
a long-term competitive advantage because similar technologies are
readily available to other competitors.
In an interview with Business Week published in August, Carr
elaborated: "It is very revealing that, almost without
exception, when people take issue with my argument, they say:
'Look at Dell and Wal-Mart.' But they built their advantage a
number of years ago, when the ability of IT to provide advantage
was greater. Where are all the other companies that have more
recently gained advantage?"
Carr's recommendations are for companies to take a conservative
path: "Spend less; follow, don't lead; focus on
vulnerabilities, not opportunities."
Mixed Response
The reactions to "IT Doesn't Matter" have varied.
Technology vendors are offended; there will continue to be
revolutionary new technologies, they insist. Corporate IT managers
point out that IT departments are way too complex to be considered
commodities.
But business leaders and financial professionals are attracted
to Carr's argument, which validates the more rigorous
return-on-investment calculations currently being applied to IT
departments.
But is Carr right? He makes several powerful points: that IT is
relatively more of a commodity than it was in the past, that
technology by itself no longer is a competitive advantage, and
that consistency and risk management in technology initiatives
have never been more critical.
Carr's description of a commoditized IT landscape is clearly
relevant to the troubled world of technology vendors. His argument
particularly resonates against the notions that "the Internet
will change everything" and that dot-coms had the potential
to put "bricks-and-mortar" market leaders out of
business.
Investors attempted to fund these new winners, and market
leaders created dot-com subsidiaries to protect their flanks.
Carr's article explains why most of these were failures.
But information technology never was a competitive advantage in
and of itself. As Carr himself points out in Business Week, Dell
succeeded with its direct-sales model for years using an 800
number. The Internet simply added value to an already-successful
business model, which was that of a supply-chain innovator.
Historical Contradictions
The history of other revolutionary technologies suggests that
Carr may be shortsighted in claiming that mature technologies
cannot be leveraged for strategic advantage. Many companies in the
past and present reinvented their industry, leveraging a
"commoditized" technology in an unforeseen manner:
• The same edition of Business Week describes how Progressive
Insurance is intertwining the Internet and wireless technologies
to allow mobile adjusters to process claims at the site of
accidents. What began as mundane reengineering of workflow
eventually transformed the customer experience and become a
strategic advantage.
• In auto manufacturing, the U.S. manufacturing industry was
solidified by 1930. But Honda and Toyota, the top two global auto
firms of today, started after World War II. Their championing of
lean manufacturing allowed them to grow into the dominant global
brands they are today; indeed, it became the essence of their
brand.
• McDonald's and UPS grew into Fortune 500 companies decades
later, their business models dependent on the internal combustion
engine.
In the coming years, numerous great businesses will be created
on the platform of the IT revolution of the past decade. And as
always, well-managed, aggressive businesses will be tough to
dislodge.